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IN LOCO PARENTIS: DEFINITION,
APPLICATION, AND IMPLICATION
In loco parenti's connotes a relation with which few, if any,
persons have not had some contact; yet these words are foreign
to the vocabulary of many. In loco parentis has been defined as
follows: "In the place of a parent; instead of a parent, charged
factitiously with a parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities."1
Whether the relation, in loco parentis, exists depends on the
facts of each individual situation.2 If such a relation exists, the
rights, duties, and liabilities of the person standing "in the place
of a parent" are the same as those of a lawful parent. The
assumption of the relation is a question of intention and not
of chance. Once established, the relationship is presumed to
to continue, and the one claiming discontinuance has the burden
of so proving.3
In the New Mexico case of Criego v. Hogan4 the court stated
that the relation of in loco parentis exists
[w]hen a person undertakes the care and control of
another in the absence of such supervision by the
latter's natural parents and in the absence of formal
legal approval. It is temporary in character and not
likened to an adoption, which is permanent.
If the relationship is established, what are the rights of the
parties enjoying the privilege of such relationship? It is gen-
erally found that one standing in loco parentis to a child enjoys
1. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 896 (4th ed. 1951).
2. See Wilson v. Wilson, 14 Ohio App. 2d 148, 237 N.E.2d 421 (1968)
(where the court found that the clearest evidence of consent to stand in loco
parentis occurs when a person takes a child into his custody as a member of
his own family); Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767 (D.C. 1968), petition to
appeal-denied, 418 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (where it was found that
the duties of one in loco parentis arises only when one is willing to assume all
obligations and to receive all benefits associated with one standing as natural
parent to a child. See also Morgan v. Smith, 429 Pa. 561, 241 A.2d 531
(1968) (a case of first impression, which held that the status in loco parentis
embodies two ideas, 1. the assumption of parental status, and 2. the discharge
of parental duties).
3. 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 72 (1950).
4. 71 N.M. 280, 377 P.2d 953 (1963).
5. Id. at 295, 377 P.2d at 955, citing In re McCardle's Estate, 95 Colo. 250,
35 P2d 850 (1934).
6. The existence of the relation, in loco parentis, is often thought to exist
only between adults and children, and for the sake of convenience this is the
situation referred to unless it is specifically designated otherwise. See note
64 infra.
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the custody of the child,7 and necessarily acquires such power
of control over the person of the child as is necessary to maintain
the family entity adequately." In addition to the benefits received
by a person in loco parentis, certain obligations are also assumed.
These obligations include requiring that the person in loco
parentis care for and educate the child,9 be liable for neces-
saries furnished to the child,1" and not be allowed, while such
relation exists, to assert a claim for such support."
Reference having been made to the basic principles under-
lying the relation of in loco parentis, the intention of this note
is: (1) to present several of the areas in which the privilege is
found, (2) to examine the law as it has developed in each area
to date, and (3) to attempt to determine the extent to which the
privilege extends. By such analysis guidelines will be presented
that will aid the practitioner when confronted by a case in
which the relation, in loco parentis, possibly exists.
I. LtiAnrrx FoR DIscIPmNm BY ON
IN Loco PA!IENTIS GEi@NmILLY
The first area to be discussed, and the one where problems
are most likely to arise in society today, concerns the necessity
of a person in loco parentis having the authority to discipline
the persons in his charge.12 Prosser recognizes the need for such
privilege and the resulting protection afforded one in the exer-
cise of it.13
The general rule concerning the authority of a person in loco
parentis with regard to discipline is that reasonable force for the
correction or punishment of a child may be used by a parent
or a person standing in the place of a parent.14 The first ques-
tion to be asked is whether or not the person claiming the pro-
7. Niewidomski v. United States, 159 F2d 683 (C.C.A. Miss. 1947), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 850. (1947).
8. Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill. App. 577 (1896).
9. Waldrup v. Crane, 203 Ga. 388, 46 S.E.2d 919 (1948).
10. Rudd v. Fineberg's Trustee, 277 Ky. 505, 126 S.W2d 1102 (1939).
11. Id.
12. At the onset of the discussion of liability surrounding discipline of
children, it is noted that both civil and criminal liability should be considered.
While it is clear that in most situations involving criminal liability, civil
liability may also be imposed (not vithstandng inter-family tort immunities),
the converse is not always the case; civil liability may be based on negligence
but criminal liability often demands more. This note will utilize the term,
"liability," as a general reference to tort concepts, leaving reflection on
possible criminal liability for the reader's own consideration.
13. W. PossER, HANDBOOK: OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 27 (3d ed. 1964).
14. Id.
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tection of the rule is in fact in loco parentis and therefore
entitled to such protection. As stated earlier, the existence of
the rule depends on the facts of the individual case.'0 If the
person claiming protection is found to be in loco parentis, it
then becomes a question of whether his act was privileged by
the rule.
There are two views prevalent in the United States today.1 6
The majority view considers the reasonableness of the de-
fendant's act and determines whether such act was willful,
wrongful, or unlawful.' 7 The minority view perhaps affords
greater protection to the defendant. Under this position, the
defendant is within the protection of the privilege unless the
act resulted in permanent injury to the child or was inflicted
with malice.' It should be noted at this point that punishment
for an improper purpose, or punishment that is itself improper,
will not fall within the protection of the rule.'0
Courts purporting to follow the majority view find that a
person in loco parentis, when inflicting punishment, must not
exceed the bounds of moderation and reasonableness and that
any act found to be cruel, merciless, unreasonable, or immoder-
ate exceeds the privilege and will subject the actor to liability.20,
The following conditions have been stated to be pertinent:21
1. The actor's relationship to the child; 2. the age of
the child; 3. the child's sex; 4. the child's physical and
mental condition; 5. the nature of the offense and ap-
parent motive; 6. whether the punishment or co nfine-
ment is reasonably necessary and appropriate; 7.
whether the punishment is disproportionate to the
offense; 8. whether the punishment is necessarily de-
grading; 9. whether the punishment is likely to cause
permanent injury or serious harm; 10. whether the
15. 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 72 (1950).
16. Tripp, Acting "It Loco Parentis" as a Defense to Assault and Battery,
16 CIXv.-MAR. L. REv. 39 (1967).
17. Id. at 42.
18. Id. at 42-43.
19. Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 399 (1963).
20. People v. Curtis, 116 Cal. App. 771, 300 P. 801 (1931); State v.
Spiegel, 39 Wyo. 309, 270 P. 1064 (1928); Steber v. Norris, 188 Wis. 366,
206 N.W. 173 (1925); Clasen v. Prubs, 69 Neb. 278, 95 N.W. 640 (1903);
Hinkle v. State, 127 Ind. 490, 26 N.E. 777 (1891); Patterson v. Nutter, 78
Me. 509, 7 A. 273 (1886) ; Stanfield v. State, 43 Tex. 167 (1875) ; Lander v.
Seaver, 32 Vt 114, 76 Am. Dec. 156 (1859).
21. Tripp, Acting "It Loco Parentis" as a Defense to Assault and Battery,
16 CLEV.-MAR L. REv. 39 (1967).
[Vol. 23
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punishment was inflicted for a salutary purpose; 11.
whether the actors were free from malice; 12. the
childs example on other children; 13. the kind of in-
strument used; 14. the extent or nature of the use of the
instrument; 15. the sensitivity of the child; 16. the
child's responsibilities; 17. the child's tolerance to
pain; 18. whether the child was old enough to under-
stand the punishment.
22
It appears that the majority of jurisdictions also recognizes that
the reasonableness of the punishment shall be determined by the
jury or by the court as finder of fact according to the require-
ments applicable to the particular offense with which the
defendant is charged.
23
The position taken by the minority of states with regard to
liability for punishment inflicted on a child by one in loco
parentis requires that the punishment result in permanent in-
jury or was inflicted with malice, either express or implied.
2 4
This standard affords greater protection to the defendant in
that he will not be liable for an error in judgment as to the
necessity for punishment or because it might appear that the
punishment was not proportionate to the offense.25  In juris-
dictions following this view the criminal liability of one in loco
parentis depends, as a general rule, upon the establishment of
the constituent elements of the particular crime charged.
26
II. LIABLrry FOR DIsCiPIE BY A TEACHER
The relation between a teacher and his pupil is one in loco
parenti.2 7 This relation has been said to have been delegated
22. Id. at 43, 44; citing Annot., 2 Am. Jum. Proof of Facts, Par. 2, and
Assault and Battery Proof, Par. 7 Discipline (1959) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 150 (1965) ; State v. Hunt, 2 Ariz. App. 6, 406 P.2d 208 (1965);
State v. Straight, 136 Mont. 255, 347 P.2d 482 (1959); State v. Henggeler,
312 Mo. 15, 278 S.W. 743 (1925).
23. Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 399, 404 (1963).
24. Tripp, Acting "In Loco Parentis" as a Defense to Assault and Battery,
16 CLEV.-IIAR. L. REv. 39, 45 (1967). Alabama Courts have allowed malice
to be proven by the nature of the instrument involved. Haydon v. State, 15
Ala. App. 61, 72 S.586 (1916); Dean v. State, 89 Ala. 46, 8 S. 38 (1890).
In Nicholas v. State, 32 Ala. App. 574, 28 S.2d 422 (1946), a verdict of guilty
was rendered against a man who beat a child for an hour with a rubber belt
for wetting. Such conduct was admissible as evidence of malice.
25. Cameron v. State, 24 Ala. App. 438, 136 So. 418 (1931).
26. Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 339, 410 (1963). An early South Carolina case,
State v. Shaw, 64 S.C. 566, 43 S.E.14 (1902) supports this position.
27. Brooks v. Jacobs, 139 Me. 371, 31 A.2d 414 (1943); Roberson v. State,
22 Ala. App. 413, 116 S. 317 (1928). See W. PROSSER, HANDBooK OF THE
LAw OF TORT § 134 (3d ed. 1964); Proehl, Tort Liability of Teachers, 12
VAN. L. REv. 723 (1959).
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by the parent, by sending his child to school, to the teacher.28
This justification is tenuous, however, because state compulsory
eduction laws require children to go to school.29 Rather, a
more logical reason for allowing the teacher to stand in loco
parentis to the students, thereby resulting in the privilege to
discipline the students, stems from the necessity of maintaining
order at the school.3 0
This rule ordinarily affords the teacher the right to inflict
punishment which is not excessive upon a pupil without incur-
ring liability, although there is disagreement on the question of
what constitutes excessiveness.3' The cases in this area reflect
the divergence in view between the authorities which adopt the
rule that a teacher may inflict punishment upon a pupil which
is reasonable and moderate under the circumstances without
becoming liable for an assault or injury and those which refuse
to adopt the reasonableness test and state that liability arises
only upon evidence that the punishment was inflicted with
malice or resulted in permanent injury. As recognized from
the preceding discussion, the authorities which adopt the first
rule represent the majority whereas the latter position repre-
sents the minority.
Although South Carolina has no law governing corporal
punishment in the schools, an opinion by the Attorney General
gives recognition to the privilege generally afforded teachers
to discipline unruly pupils without incurring liability.3 2 The
opinion states that the South Carolina Constitution, while pro-
hibiting any law which inflicts corporal punishment, was
intended to prohibit the passage of a law which would authorize
the infliction of corporal punishment under sentence of the
court. So far as teachers are concerned, the opinion goes on,
the common law controls, and common sense is the crucial factor
in determining the action necessary to maintain discipline in
the schools. It is also stated that it has long been recognized
that teachers may administer reasonable punishment, while
cruel and harsh punishment would subject them to a charge of
assault and battery. The degree of punishment would be the
28. State v. Pendegrass, 19 N.C. 365 (1837).
29. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 27 (3d ed. 1964).
30. Stevens v. Fossett, 27 Me. 266 (1847); McCleod v. Grant County
School District, 42 Wash. 2d 316, 255 P.2d 360 (1953).
31. Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 399 (1963).
32. 1956-1957 Ops. AT'y GEN. 247.
(Vol. 2
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guide as to whether a teacher would be found guilty of assault
and battery.33
The proposition could be advanced that, if corporal punish-
ment was abolished, there would be no need for the protection
afforded teachers by in loco parentis, and if a pupil were struck
by a teacher, the teacher's status would be immaterial. The
undersirability of this approach was voiced in a survey taken
of educators throughout the United States.34 The conclusions
from the survey revealed genuine concern over the ever-increas-
ing unruliness and disorder within the schools. Of those sur-
veyed, numerous responses advocated repeal of laws prohibiting
corporal punishment; no response advocated further prohibi-
tions.35 As mentioned, a South Carolina Attorney General's
opinion has recognized the need for corporal punishment in
maintaining the necessary degree of control and discipline in the
public schools.36 A subsequent opinion of the Attorney Gen-
eral37 recognized the powers of school superintendents as being
very broad. These powers are derived from powers vested in the
school board and include authority to make rules and regula-
tions concerning discipline in the schools.
Although this latter opinion was specifically directed to the
authority of the school board of trustees to regulate the length
of hair on male students, it recognized the inherent power
vested in the board by the Code of Laws of South Carolina of
1962, which provides that the board of trustees shall:
(3) Promulgate rules prescribing scholastic standards
of conduct and behavior that must be met by all pupils
as a condition to the right of such pupils to attend the
public schools of such district. The rules shall take into
account the necessity of proper conduct on the part of
all pupils and the necessity for scholastic progress in
order that the welfare of the greatest possible number
of pupils shall be promoted .... 38
The delegation of authority by the school board to a prin-
cipal to maintain discipline in his school was upheld in Stanley
v. Gary." In Stanley the court stated:
33. Id. at 247.
34. K. JAMES, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 183 (1963).
35. Id.
36. 1956-1957 Ops. AT'Y GEN. 247.
37. 1965-1966 Ops. A T'y GEN. 134.
38. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-230 (Supp. 1969).
39. 237 S.C. 237, 116 S.E.2d 843 (1960).
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The maintenance of discipline and the standards of
behavior in a body of students in a high school is a
task committed to its faculty and officers and not to
the courts. In matters of discipline, a broad discretion
is accorded the faculty and teachers .... 4
Having noted that some corporal punishment is permissible,
it becomes necessary to determine when the privilege exists.
(In the following examination reference -will generally be made
to only the majority jurisdictions.) In the case of Dm r W.
Miller,41 the Court, after recognizing the teacher's authority to
correct his pupils by corporal punishment, held that any act
done by the teacher in the exercise of this authority, and not
prompted by malice, was not actionable, although it may cause
permanent injury of some kind, unless a person of ordinary
prudence could reasonably foresee that a permanent injury of
some kind would probably result. The very nature of this
concept emphasizes that, before a privilage is found, the rea-
sonableness of the punishment must be considered.41 Normally,
the person claiming the privilege has the burden of establishing
the reasonableness of his conduct.4 3 Certain cases dealing with
the question have, however, shifted the burden of proof by
affording the teacher a presumption of reasonableness.44
One of the most important factors which are required to be
taken into consideration in determining whether corporal pun-
ishment administered by a teacher to a pupil is privileged is the
nature of the punishment itself.4" The evaluation of the punish-
ment encompasses both the method in which the punishment
was inflicted and the extent of the resulting injury to the stu-
dent. Also important in ascertaining whether a privilege exists
is the nature of the pupil's conduct. 46 Consideration should be
given to the teacher's apparent motive, disposition, and the
40. Id. at 243, 116 S.E.2d at 846.
41. 135 N.C. 204, 47 S.E. 421 (1904).
42. Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 469 § 111(5) (1955).
43. Harris v. Galilley, 125 Pa. Super. 505, 189 A. 779 (1937).
44. Drake v. Thomas, 310 Ill. App. 57, 33 N.E.2d 889 (1941). Here the
court stated that in the absence of testimony, the presumption would be that
the punishment was reasonable, but after evidence was introduced in regard
to the matter, presumptions concerning it ceased to exist, and the issue of
whether it was excessive or proper was then to be determined from the weight
of the evidence. Other cases which apparently allow a presumption of rea-
sonableness to exist, although proscribing different terminology, i.e., benefit
of any doubt, are Calway v. Williamson, 130 Conn. 575, 36 A.2d 377 (1944);
Melen v. McLaughlin, 107 Vt. 111, 176 A. 297 (1935); Patterson v. Nutter,
78 Me. 509, 7 A. 273 (1886).
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effect or influence which the punishment has on other stu-
dents. 47
The physical condition of the child should also weigh heavily
in determining whether the teacher exceeded the privilege
established by the teacher-child relationship. 48 While certain
punishment may be inflicted upon a strong, healthy child, the
same punishment may result in serious injury to a child whose
health is poor. Problems also arise when the child possesses
unusual susceptibility to harm from the type of punishment in-
flicted by the teacher. In the English case of Mansell v. Grif-
fin,49 the court stated that a teacher is not liable for reasonable
corporal punishment administered to a child, notwithstanding
that because of the child's unusual susceptibility to harm from
the type of punishment rendered, which susceptibility was un-
known to the teacher, the results of such punishment were more
serious than could have been anticipated. 50
Possibly one of the foremost criteria to be used in assessing
liability is the teacher's motive. Several courts allow a presump-
tion to exist that, if the punishment was not excessive, the
teacher had good cause to discipline the child.5' In Van Vactor
v. State, 2 the Indiana Supreme Court said that it was within
the rights of a teacher to enforce discipline, that compliance
with all reasonable commands could be exacted, and that a
teacher, when acting reasonably, could inflict corporal punish-
ment for disobedience. This right to discipline, however, ex-
tended only to punishment that was proportionate to the
gravity of the offense and was within the bounds of moderation.
The court further stated that, where no improper weapon had
been used, the presumption existed that such punishment was
rightly exercised, and that, subject to the general rules, a
teacher's right and duty to inflict corporal punishment upon
a pupil, and its reasonableness, must be judged by the varying
circumstances of each particular case. 53
Perhaps at this point, better service can be rendered by illu-
strating situations in which teachers have been held liable for
punishment inflicted upon their students, and alternatively,
47. Calway v. Williamson, 130 Conn. 575, 36 A2d 377 (1944).
48. Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 So. 2d 48 (1954).
49. [1908] 1 K.B. 160.
50. Id.
51. Van Vactor v. State, 113 Ind. 276, 15 N.E. 341 (1888); Harris v.
State, 83 Tex. Crim. 468, 203 S.W. 1089 (1918).
52. 113 Ind. 276, 15 N.E. 341 (1888).
53. Id. at 277, 15 N.E. at 342.
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situations in which the teachers were not liable. Since the basic
question is one of fact, only the roughest sort of guide can be
determined. Attention will first be devoted to those instances
in which the teacher was found to be liable.
In the Connecticut case of Calway v. Williason,G4 a school
principal was held liable after he pushed the student to the
floor and knelt on the student's abdomen; this course of action
resulting in the student struggling to free himself and suffering
burns and breaks in the skin which developed into osteomyelitis.
In Harris v. Galilley"5 the court imposed liability on a Pennsyl-
vania school principal, who was empowered by statute to in-
flict corporal punishment, when necessary, upon pupils. The
principal in Harris slapped the pupil on the back of the neck,
which resulted in permanent injury. Rupp v. Zintner0 was
another Pennsylvania case which this time dealt with a child
being permanently injured by punishment inflicted by a
teacher. In Rupp, the punishment took the form of a blow over
the pupil's right ear. The blow injured the pupil's eardrum
and permanently damaged his hearing in that ear.
Helen v. McLaughlin,57 a Vermont decision, was another
situation where a teacher was found liable. The punishment was
administered because of the pupil's inability to solve an arith-
metic problem and consisted of a blow with a book over the
pupil's kidney. The blow was inflicted at a time when the
child was bent over to pick up an eraser that had been shaken
from her hand by the teacher. As a result of this punishment,
the pupil, a girl eleven years of age, was required to remain for
almost two months in a cast extending from under her arms to
half way down her legs.
A recent Louisiana case, Frank v. Orleans Parish Soiwol
Board,58 allowed a student to recover for a fractured arm.
In holding the teacher liable, the court held that the degree of
force that may be used by a school teacher in disciplining a
student in a public school depends on the individual facts and
environmental characteristics emanating from each case. Al-
though the court specifically refrained from doing so, they
inferred that a teacher's touching a student could possibly be
actionable per se.
54. 130 Conn. 575, 36 A.2d 377 (1944).
55. 125 Pa. Super 505, 189 A. 779 (1937) (holding evidence sufficient to
support a jury verdict in favor of the pupil).
56. 29 Pa. C.&D. 625 (1937).
67. 107 Vt. 111, 176 A. 297 (1935).
58. 195 So. 2d 451 (La. 1967).
[Vol. 23
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The Alabama case of Suits v. Glover59 is illustrative of a
situation where the teacher was found not to be liable. In Suits
it was shown that the teacher was authorized to administer
corporal punishment in order to maintain order and discipline
in the school and that, when confronted by a healthy eight
and one-half year old student scuffling in the hall and being
insubordinate, the teacher was justified in disciplining the stu-
dent and such discipline would not subject the teacher to
liability. (Note, however that Alabama is a minority jurisdic-
tion.)
In Mar lei v. Bil, 0° a Tennessee case, a teacher struck a stu-
dent several times with a ruler. The court determined that the
teacher acted without malice, that the student violated a school
regulation, and that, as a result of his denial, the teacher was
justified in administering the punishment.
Deskins v. Gose,61 a Missouri Supreme Court decision af-
forded the teacher freedom from liability for whipping a
student with a switch. The punishment was inflicted because
of an infraction of the school's rule against using profane
language and fighting on his way home from school.
Looking at the question of the reasonableness of the punish-i
ment, the Arizona Supreme Court in LaFrentz v. Gallagher
2
held that punishment administered to a pupil as a disciplinary
measure is "privileged" and does not give rise to a cause of
action for damages against the teacher. In LaFrentz a teacher
shoved a small boy while the latter was playing softball. The
court recognized the need for reasonable punishment and denied
recovery to the plaintiff.
What punishment will fall within the protection of the
special privilege of in Zoco parentis must be determined from
the facts of a particular case; the above cases are only illustra-
tive of different applications of the in Zoco parentis doctrine.
However, it is hoped that certain insights have been created
and that the necessity of the existence of such a privilege has
been justified. It is a very serious matter any time punishment
must be inflicted on a child, and the use of punishment as a
means of correction must be distinguished from punishment as
an abuse. The minority rule, which requires permanent injury
59. 260 Ala. 449, 41 So. 2d 49 (1954).
60. 181 Tenn. 100, 178 S.W2d 634 (1944).
61. 85 Mo. 485, 55 Am. Rep. 387 (1885).
62. 105 Ariz. 255, 462 P.2d 804 (1969).
10
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or malice before liability arises affords too little protection to
the child. The majority view appears to afford the child ample
protection and yet does not deny the person standing in loco
parentis the authority to maintain the proper amount of control.
Under this view the person standing in loco parentis is not the
final arbiter of what punishment is reasonable. The public,
through the realm of the jury, is and should be the ultimate
body to render such determination. While South Carolina has
taken no formal position in this matter, adoption of the reason-
ableness standard would seem to be compatable with present
practices concerning discipline in the schools and in harmony
with existing Attorney General Opinions.63
III. OTHER SITUATIONS IN WHICH
IN Loco PARENTis EXISTS
,The prior discussion involves the areas of the in looo parentis
relation that are most frequently encountered. One area in
which few people realize that the relation of in loco parentis
can exist is between adults. Although thoughts generally run to
an adult-child relationship when the term in Zoco parentis arises,
such relationship is not so confined. In Banks v. United
States64 the court held that an adult could stand in loco parentis
to another adult. In determining whether the relationship did,
in fact, exist, the same considerations are involved as in an
adult-child relationship. Banks elaborated the rule that finan-
cial support is only one objective manifestation of the existence
of such relationship. Banks also stood for the proposition that
a person occupying the position in loco parentis could recover
as the beneficiary of an insurance policy. This view lends sup-
port to the theory that, once such relation is established, the
persons enjoying the privilege possess an "insurable interest"
and are thus entitled to recover. 5
Another area that is becoming increasingly important is the
right of a child to bring an action against a person standing
63. See opinions cited notes 32 and 37 supra.
64. 267 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1959).
65. A similar result was reached in Thomas v. United States, 189 F.2d 494
6th (Cir. 1961), where an aunt, who occupied an in loco parcntis relation to
her nephew, was entitled to the proceeds of his life insurance policy. The
court held that financial support was not required to establish such relationship
but that it could be proven in other ways. See also Zazove v. United States,
156 F2d 24 (7th Cir. 1946), where an adult aunt was allowed to receive
insurance benefits as a result of standing in loco parentis to an adult nephew.
The aunt qualified as a beneficiary under the National Service Life Insurance
Act, where such persons were allowed to recover as beneficiaries.
[Vol. 23
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in Zoco parentis for personal injuries suffered by the child. The
general rule6 6 states that an unemancipated child cannot bring
an action for damages for personal injuries against a step-
parent who stands in loco parenti. unless such right is granted
by statute.67 Suits of this nature have been sustained, but in all
of them the cause of action appears to have been based upon
some type of deliberate or malicious wrong or cruel or inhuman
treatment.68 The South Carolina case of Gunn v. Rollings69 illus-
trates the difficulties which a child may have in maintaining a
tort action. In 6!unn, two minor children brought an action
against the administrator of their stepfather's estate for injuries
sustained while riding as passengers in their stepfather's auto-
mobile. Their stepfather died as a result of injuries sustained in
the accident.
In explaining their decision, the court gave the following
reason for not allowing children to recover for injuries suffered
as a result of a parent's negligence:
The rule prohibiting suit by a minor against the parent
for a personal tort is based upon considerations of public
policy, which discourage causes of action that tend to
undermine and destroy family unity and parental dis-
cipline.
70
Although this policy consideration generally is directed spe-
cifically to the parent-child relationship, the same rules apply
to persons acting in loco parentis and recovery was rightfully
denied.
IV. TEiNAnATION
To determine when the in loco parentis relationship termi-
nates, it is necessary to look again at the nature of the relation-
ship. As seen earlier, in loco parentis exists
when a person undertakes the care and control of an-
other in the absence of such supervision by the latter's
natural parents and in the absence of formal legal ap-
66. 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 61(b) (2) (1950).
67. Id.
68. 39 Ax. Jun. Parent and Child § 90. (1941).
69. 250 S.C. 302, 157 S.E2d 590 (1957). The court stated that South Caro-
lina law prohibits an unemancipated child from recovering against his parent
for personal injuries caused by his parents' negligence. The court further
proclaimed that these rules also applied to a relation in loco parentis so long
as this relationship exists.
70. Id. at 305, 157 S.E.2d at 591, citing Fowler v. Fowler, 242 S.C. 252.
130 S.E2d 568 (1963).
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proval. It is temporary in character and not likened to
an adoption, which is permanent."
1
Since the relationship is temporary, it necessarily follows that
it can be terminated. This point was discussed in the South
Carolina case of Chestnut v. Chestnut,72 where the court held
that the in loco parentis relationship could be terminated at
will by either party. However, once established, the relation is
presumed to continue, and the party claiming discontinuance
has the burden of so proving.
V. Coi ow.s IO
A person need only keep abreast of daily news to be keenly
aware of the strife and turmoil existent in society. These con-
ditions dictate a pressing need for clarification of the stand-
ards by which a teacher is to be judged for discipline inflicted
upon students under his control. In order to maintain the
required degree of control over the classrooms, a teacher should
be able to utilize corporal punishment that is reasonable under
the circumstances in which it is administered. So long as the
punishment does not exceed these bounds, the teacher should be
afforded the protection of the relation, in loco parentis, and
not be subject to liability. In other situations where in loco
parentis exists, the rights, duties, and liabilities should be the
same as for a natural parent or guardian.
JAmms L. EDWAIS
71. Griego v. Hogan, 71 N.M. 280, 295, 377 P.2d 953, 955 (1963) (emphasis
added).
72. 247 S.C. 332, 147 S.E.2d 269 (1966).
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